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Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting
for Last-Mile Travel Demands
(Extended Abstract)
Shih-Fen Cheng Duc Thien Nguyen Hoong Chuin Lau




A great challenge of city planners is to provide efficient and
effective connection service to travelers using public trans-
portation system. This is commonly known as the last-mile
problem and is critical in promoting the utilization of pub-
lic transportation system. In this paper, we address the
last-mile problem by considering a dynamic and demand-
responsive mechanism for arranging ride sharing on a non-
dedicated commercial fleet (such as taxis or passenger vans).
Our approach has the benefits of being dynamic, flexible,
and with low setup cost. A critical issue in such ride-sharing
service is how riders should be grouped and serviced, and
how fares should be split. We propose two auction designs
which are used to solicit individual rider’s willing payment
rate and compensation rate (for extra travel, if any). We
demonstrate that these two auctions are budget balanced,
individually rational, and incentive compatible. A series of
experimental studies based on both synthetic and real-world
datasets are designed to demonstrate the pros and cons of
our two proposed auction mechanisms in various settings.
Categories and Subject Descriptors




ride sharing, mechanism design, cost sharing
1. INTRODUCTION
In most urban cities, building and promoting the use of
public transport is the only way to satisfy demands from
the ever-increasing city population. Improving the acces-
sibility and attractiveness of public transport is thus an
important policy goal for most city planners. In this pa-
per, we study the design of ride-sharing-based last-mile ser-
vices for cities with well-established public transports and
assume that there is a fleet of committed service vehicles
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who are willing to serve ride-sharing passengers at predeter-
mined distance-based fare. Although these service vehicles
can come from any sources, vacant taxis or passenger vans
would be the best candidates, as serving last-mile demands
also help to alleviate overcapacity during off-peak hours.
All last-mile demands should depart from the same hub
at the same time, and should be reported sufficiently earlier
than their estimated arrival times at the hub. Demands are
then assigned to available individual service vehicles, where
service sequences and corresponding payments are computed
for all demands.
To facilitate such last-mile service, we need to address two
important classes of closely related problems. The first prob-
lem is to assign last-mile demands to individual vehicles and
to determine service orders. The second problem is to de-
termine how fares should be split among riders, considering
both distances traveled and inconveniences caused by using
ride-sharing services. The first problem is similar to the well-
known para-transit problem [2] and dial-a-ride problem [1],
and can be formulated and solved similarly; the solution for
the second problem, on the other hand, is not so obvious as
private information (e.g., desired meter rate) from individ-
ual riders is needed. To solicit reliable private information
from individuals, we need to design mechanisms that are
guaranteed to be incentive compatible and implementable.
2. MECHANISMDESIGNFORPROBLEMS
WITH SPATIAL REQUIREMENTS
Our proposed mechanisms are different from classical ones
found in literature since agents would value their received
services based on allocation itself and extra travel required.
This implies that agent’s utilities depend not just on their
own choices, but also on other agents’ choices and alloca-
tions. To reflect this special property, we define agent’s util-
ity function in the ride-sharing context as follows:
ui = (misi −mi(Bi − si))− (m∗si −m∗(Bi − si)) , (1)
where mi is agent i’s private payment and compensation rate
for distance traveled, Bi is agent i’s real distance traveled, si
is agent i’s direct travel distance, and m∗ is the rate actually
charged. The first part of ui reflects how agent i would
value any allocation, and the second part of ui represents
the payment agent i needs to pay.
With the utility function defined in (1), we are now ready
to define our mechanism, which is essentially an auction ca-
pable of handling both the price and spatial information.
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A bid acceptable by our auction mechanism is in the form
of (si,mi), where si denotes both agent i’s destination and
the direct travel distance to reach it (from the hub), and mi
denotes agent i’s desired meter rate.
As a DARP-style routing problem needs to be solved for
each winner determination instance, exact formulation would
not be scalable enough to meet the short turnaround time
given (usually less than 10 minutes in practice). To address
such limitation, we propose two approximate mechanisms
that are scalable while at the same time still demonstrate
desirable properties such as incentive compatibility and bud-
get balance. In the interest of space, we highlight only the
first mechanism.
2.1 The Bottom-up Mechanism
The formal definition of the clearing rule of the bottom-
up mechanism can be found in Algorithm 1. The inputs
required by the Algorithm 1 include N , which denotes the
set of all riders, and {(si,mi)}i∈N , which represents the col-
lection of bids for all riders in N .
The bottom-up mechanism first solves Program-A1 to
obtain an assignment and routing plan. For each solution
obtained, we check whether the lowest paying customer can
afford the returned meter rate (line 4). If not, the lowest pay-
ing customer is removed from the set N (line 6); the lower
bound on the meter rate (ml) is also updated accordingly
(line 5). The above process repeats until a solution that
satisfies all individual payment constraints is found. At ter-
mination, the bottom-up mechanism reports the set of riders
to be served (S), how riders in S are grouped (denoted as ki,
which represents the identity of the service vehicle assigned
to rider i), the service order in the group (denoted as ai)
and the meter rate (m∗) to be paid by all served customers.
Algorithm 1: The bottom-up mechanism.
Input: (N, {(si,mi)}i∈N )
Output: (S, {(ki, ai)}i∈S ,m∗)
1 S ← ∅, ml = 0
2 while N 6= ∅ do
3 (S, {(ki, ai)}i∈S ,m∗)← Program-A(N,ml)
4 if mini∈Smi < m∗ then
5 ml = mini∈Smi
6 N ← N \ {arg mini∈Smi}
7 else
8 N ← ∅
9 end
10 end
11 return (S, {(ki, ai)}i∈S ,m∗)
2.2 Important Properties
The bottom-up mechanism can be shown to be budget bal-
anced, individually rational, and incentive compatible. Bud-
get balance is built in as a constraint in Program-A. Indi-
vidual rationality is embedded in Algorithm 1, since riders
with mi < m
∗ in all intermediate allocations are removed.
1Program-A is an integer linear programming model used
to compute all the intermediate outputs, and is a variant of
the well-known DARP model. Due to the space limit, the
complete mathematical model is not included.
The incentive compatibility result can also be proved as we
can easily show that an agent would gain nothing by lying
about his true value.
3. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The performance of our proposed mechanisms are tested
using both synthetic and real-world-inspired datasets. For
all cases, we measure the following four metrics: 1) num-
ber of riders, 2) sum of direct-travel distance served, 3)
distance saved due to shared rides, and 4) rider’s surplus.
The real-world-inspired dataset is based on the last-mile
Figure 1: Concentration of last-mile demands around one of
the busiest hub in Singapore. The hub is labeled as the black
square near the center of the map. The density of demands
(frequency of occurrence) is represented by both the color
(using the lower-left legend) and the size of the circle.
travel demands captured by the EZ-Link payment system
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EZ-Link) in Singapore. The
EZ-Link payment system is an electronic payment system
that can be used for all modes of public transportation in
Singapore. Its penetration is almost universal among resi-
dents, and as such, we can identify travelers who alight at
a major station and go on to make short travels to nearby
neighborhoods (via buses or light-rails). We focus on one
of the busiest train station in Singapore, Ang Mo Kio. The
distribution of last-mile demands can be found in Figure 1,
with color and size of circle showing different levels of de-
mand concentrations. The black square near the center of
the map is the hub.
From all numerical results, we can see that in general
the bottom-up mechanism dominates the raising-cost mech-
anism (the other approximate mechanism not included due
to space limit) in the first three metrics, while the raising-
cost mechanism produces better rider’s surplus.
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